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Abstract—Despite the promising potential of network risk management services (e.g., cyber-insurance) to improve information
security, their deployment is relatively scarce, primarily due to such service companies being unable to guarantee profitability. As a
novel approach to making cyber-insurance services more viable, we explore a symbiotic relationship between security vendors (e.g.,
Symantec) capable of price differentiating their clients, and cyber-insurance agencies having possession of information related to the
security investments of their clients. The goal of this relationship is to (i) allow security vendors to price differentiate their clients based
on security investment information from insurance agencies, (ii) allow the vendors to make more profit than in homogeneous pricing
settings, and (iii) subsequently transfer some of the extra profit to cyber-insurance agencies to make insurance services more viable.
In this paper, we perform a theoretical study of a market for differentiated security product pricing, primarily with a view to ensuring that
security vendors (SVs) make more profit in the differentiated pricing case as compared to the case of non-differentiated pricing. In order
to practically realize such pricing markets, we propose novel and computationally efficient consumer differentiated pricing mechanisms
for SVs based on (i) the market structure, (ii) the communication network structure of SV consumers captured via a consumer’s
Bonacich centrality in the network, and (iii) security investment amounts made by SV consumers. We validate our analytical model
via extensive simulations conducted on practical SV client network topologies; main results show (through those simulations) that (a)
a monopoly SV could improve its profit margin by upto ≈ 25% (based on the simulation setting) by accounting for clients’ investment
information and network locations, whereas in an oligopoly setting, SVs could improve their profit margins by upto ≈ 18%, and (b)
differentiated security pricing mechanisms are fair among SV consumers with respect to the total investment made by a consumer.
To the best of knowledge, the proposed differentiated pricing framework is the first of its kind in the security products domain, and is
generally applicable to usecases beyond the one investigated in this work.
Index Terms—Security, Monopoly, Oligopoly, Pricing, Bonacich Centrality, {Market, Nash} Equilibrium, Randomized Algorithms
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The infrastructure, the users, and the services offered
on computer networks today are all subject to a wide
variety of risks. These risks include distributed denial
of service attacks, intrusions of various kinds, eaves-
dropping, hacking, phishing, worms, viruses, spams,
etc. Network users (both individuals and organizations)
have traditionally resorted to antivirus and anti-spam
software, firewalls, intrusion-detection systems (IDSs),
and other add-ons to reduce the likelihood of being af-
fected by threats. Currently, a large industry (companies
like Symantec, McAfee,) as well as considerable research
efforts are centered around developing and deploying
methods to detect threats and anomalies in order to
protect the cyber infrastructure and its users from the
negative impact of the anomalies.
1.1 Technology Drawbacks and Risk Management
Inspite of improvements in risk protection techniques
over the last decade due to hardware, software and
cryptographic methodologies, it is impossible to achieve
perfect/near-perfect cyber-security protection [1][2]. The im-
possibility arises due to a number of reasons (see [1] for
details): (i) scarce existence of sound technical solutions,
(ii) difficulty in designing solutions catered to varied
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intentions behind network attacks, (iii) misaligned in-
centives between network users, security product ven-
dors, and regulatory authorities regarding each taking
upon them a proper liability to protect the network, (iv)
network users taking advantage of the positive security
effects generated by other user investments in security,
in turn themselves not investing in security and resulting
in the free-riding problem, (v) customer lock-in and
first mover effects of vulnerable security products, (vi)
absence of popular vulnerability markets, e.g., settings
where vulnerabilities are traded for money, (vii) diffi-
culty measuring risks resulting in challenges to design-
ing pertinent risk removal solutions, (viii) the problem
of a lemons market [3], whereby security vendors have
no incentive to release robust products in the market,
(ix) liability shell games played by product vendors,
and (x) user naiveness in optimally exploiting feature
benefits of technical solutions. In view of these inevitable
barriers to 100% risk mitigation, the need arises for
alternative methods of risk management in cyberspace.
In this regard, some security researchers in the recent
past have identified cyber-insurance as a potential tool
for effective risk management.
Cyber-insurance is a risk management technique via
which network users transfer their risks to an insurance
company (e.g., ISP, cloud provider), in return for a fee,
i.e., the insurance premium. Researchers vouching for
the use of cyber-insurance believe that cyber-insurance
would lead to the design of insurance contracts that
would shift appropriate amounts of self-defense liability
on the clients, thereby making the cyberspace more
robust. Here the term ‘self-defense’ implies the efforts by
a network user to secure their system through technical
solutions such as anti-virus and anti-spam software,
firewalls, using secure operating systems, etc. Cyber-
insurance can also potentially be a market solution that
can align with economic incentives of cyber-insurers,
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users (individuals/organizations), policy makers, and
security software vendors, i.e., the cyber-insurers will
earn profit from appropriately pricing premiums, se-
curity risks will be appropriately shared among net-
work users and the latter will seek to hedge potential
losses by jointly buying insurance and investing in self-
defense mechanisms, the policy makers would ensure
the increase in overall network security, and the security
software vendors could go ahead with their first-mover
and lock-in strategies, and at the same time experience
an increase in their product sales via forming alliances
with cyber-insurers.
1.2 Research Motivation
We motivate our work on differentiated security pricing
by first raising the issue of moderate/unviable cyber-
insurance markets, and then introducing the concept of
price differentiating security products, and how it might,
as an idea, resolve the problem of unviable insurance
markets. We emphasize here that the use case of cyber-
insurance markets is just one instance where the concept of
price differentiating security products might be applicable.
1.2.1 Moderate Cyber-Insurance Markets
The total cyber-insurance business currently amounts to
US$ 2 billion, whereas the total cost of security breaches
to the global economy amounts to a whopping US$ 445
billion [4]. There are presently over 30 insurance carriers
in the United States offering cyber-insurance contracts,
and as of 2015, these carriers report significant yearly
increases (up to approximately 25%) in their client base,
which has primarily been corpororate organizations (ref.
Betterley Report). However, the current inability to bridge
the US$ 443 billion gap could be overcome if the cyber-
insurance business were to spread to individuals rather
than only industries and organizations. A major road-
block is the potential inability of the cyber-insurers to
make strictly positive profit at all times [5][2][6], pri-
marily due to the high degree of non-transparency of
risk information between the insurer and the insured
in a networked setting. Hence, the need of the hour is to
design alternative mechanisms that allow cyber-insurers to
make positive profit at all times without relying on the
degree of information transparency between the insurer
and the insured, and in-turn enable wide-spread adoption of
cyber-insurance products amongst individuals human users,
industries, and organizations.
Our Main Idea - We envision price differentiation of
security products amongst SV consumers to be a mech-
anism that will make cyber-insurance markets more
viable, without it requiring information on insurance
parameters such as premium or coverage.
1.2.2 A Need for Price Differentiating Security Products
Security products (e.g., antivirus software) are one of the
main sources of protection for Internet users to prevent
their communication devices from being hacked. An
important factor on the basis of which cyber-insurance
companies charge premiums to their clients (users) is the
latters’ expected risk value, which in turn is a function of,
along with other parameters, the robustness of security
protection adopted by the clients. In practice, most users
do not take advantage of the full power of a security
product, either due to the ignorance of using the product
effectively, or being willfully careless. In both cases, these
users, along with the careful and security knowledgeable
users, usually pay the same price for a security product
available in the market. Our idea in this paper is to
make SVs charge/price users (consumers) heterogenously
but proportionately, based on their security behavior. We
hypothesize, based on price differentiation principles in eco-
nomics, that in doing so the security vendors would make more
profit compared to their usual uniform pricing mechanism.
As a result, they could symbiotically transfer a portion
of their profit amounts to cyber-insurers in return for
the latter providing the vendors with (i) information
about consumer security behavior that they collect, and
(ii) vendor lock-in privileges. The making of extra profit
by the cyber-insurers in this symbiotic environment can
improve their chances of ensuring market viability.
Goal: In this paper, our two-fold goal is to (i) prove our hy-
pothesis that proportionately fair heterogenous security prod-
uct pricing among Internet users generates more profits for
SVs compared to uniform pricing, and (ii) realize a practical,
computationally efficient way to achieve price heterogeneity.
1.3 Research Contributions
We make the following contributions in this paper.
1) We propose a pricing environment consisting of
security vendors (SVs) and their clients, and
mathematically model the vendor-client interaction
mechanism that accounts for client security invest-
ment, and the positive externalities caused due to
them (see Section 2).
2) We propose a static and heterogenous product
pricing mechanism for SV clients based on the
client (consumer) logical network and their se-
curity investment amounts. Our proposed static
pricing mechanism also subsumes the uniform and
binary pricing (different prices for two different
user types) mechanisms as special cases of the
general heterogenous pricing mechanism. The lat-
ter two pricing mechanisms are of use when the
SV might be constrained in practice (e.g., due
to policy issues) to adopt differentiated pricing
schemes on security products. Our proposed pric-
ing mechanisms are based on Stackelberg games
[22]. We show in theory that there always exists
a unique Nash equilibrium value of the SV prices
and investments of their corresponding consumers,
for the pricing game entailed by the mechanisms.
In addition, we also show that despite the exis-
tence of a unique Nash equilibrium, the design of
an optimal binary pricing mechanism is an NP-
Hard problem, for which we design an efficient
randomized-approximation algorithm. Finally, us-
ing spectral graph theory, we also derive tight
bounds on the ratio of the profit margins for a
monopoly SV, with and without taking into account
network externalities (see Section 3).
3) We conduct an extensive numerical evaluation
study for monopoly and oligopoly SV settings to
highlight the effects of consumer overlay network
on SV heterogenous pricing outcomes. Specifically,
for practical real world topologies like scale free
graphs and trees (more details in Section 4), we
show that (i) the per-unit product price charged
by an SV is proportional to the Bonacich central-
ity of consumers in their overlay network, thus
obeying the results obtained in theory from Sec-
tion 3, and (ii) the total cost incurred by every
consumer (network user) in security investments
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is nearly equal, and amounts to a constant that
is independent of the underlying network topol-
ogy. The latter point implies consumer fairness (a
notion similar to network neutrality) because no
matter how a consumer is placed in an overlay
network, he pays the same total amount in security
investments as any other consumer in the network,
even though his per-unit security investment price
charged by an SV is proportional to the amount
of positive externalities he generates via his invest-
ments. Via simulation results, we also observe that
(i) a monopoly SV could improve their current profit
margins by ≈ upto 25% (based on the simulation
setting) by accounting for client location informa-
tion in the consumer network and his investment
information, whereas (ii) in an oligopoly setting, SVs
could increase their current profit margins by ≈
upto 18% (see Section 4).
As a final comment, to the best of our knowledge, the
proposed differentiated pricing framework is the first of
its kind in the security products domain, and is generally
applicable to usecases beyond the one investigated in
this work.
1.4 Related Efforts
As mentioned above, with respect to the pricing eco-
nomics of security products, ours is the first work on
differentiated security product pricing for consumers
interacting via a network. In this section, we first provide
a brief description of existing research related to non-
homogenous pricing in a network, where externalities
and the network structure are accounted for. We then
state the differences of this work with our preliminary
results [13].
Network and Investment Dependent Pricing - Given
a set of prices, our model takes the form of a network
game among interacting consumers. Recent papers that
study such games include [7][8][9][10]. A key modeling
assumption in [7][8][9], that we also adopt in our setting,
is that the payoff function of a consumer takes the form
of a linear-quadratic function. Ballester et al. [7] were the
first to note the linkage between Bonacich centrality and
Nash equilibrium outcomes in a single stage game with
local payoff complementarities. Our characterization of
optimal prices when the monopolist can perfectly price
differentiate is reminiscent of their results, since prices
are inherently related to the Bonacich centrality of each
consumer. However, both the motivation and the analysis are
quite different, since ours is a two-stage game, where a
monopolist chooses prices to maximize revenue subject
to equilibrium constraints. Also, [8] and [9] study a
similar game and interpret their results in terms of
public good provision. A number of recent papers [11]
[12] make the assumption of limited knowledge of the
logical network structure, i.e., they assume that only the
degree distribution is known, and thus derive optimal
pricing strategies that depend on this first degree mea-
sure of externalities of a consumer. In our model, we
make the assumption that the monopolist has complete
knowledge of the logical network structure and, thus,
obtain qualitatively different results: the degree is not
the appropriate measure of influence due to externality, but
rather prices are proportional to the Bonacich centrality of the
agents. On the technical side, note that assuming more
global knowledge of the network structure increases the
complexity of the problem in the following way: if only
Symbol Meaning
ui(·) utility of user (consumer) i in consumer-seller model
N number of consumers of an SV
hij externality effect of user j on user i
xi amount of self-defense goods consumed by user i
G matrix representing externality values between user pairs−−→x−i vector of self-defense amounts of users apart from i
B(·) Bonacich centrality vector of users in a logical network
c constant marginal manufacturing cost to SV
pi price per unit of self-defense good consumed by i
TABLE 1: Notation
the degree of a consumer is known, then essentially there
are as many different types of consumers as there are
different degrees. This is no longer true when more is
known: then, two consumers of the same degree may
be of different type because of the difference in the
characteristics of their neighbors, and therefore, optimal
prices charged to consumers may be different. Also, as
major differences from the above mentioned works, (i) for the
monopoly setting, we derive tight bounds on the ratio of the
profit margins for an SV, with and without taking into account
network externalities, and (ii) We study (via simulations)
network price differentiation in oligpolistic markets consisting
of multiple competing SVs.
Differences with Preliminary Results [13] - In a previ-
ous effort [13] related to this paper, we had formalized
the differentiated pricing problem for network users and
proved it to be NP-Hard (for the binary pricing case). In
this paper, we surmount the computational challenges
of the binary pricing problem and propose an approx-
imation algorithm for that problem (see Section 3.3,
Theorem 5 and its proof.). Also, in contrast to [13], in this
paper we (i) validate the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithm via extensive simulations run on monopoly
and competitive security vendor markets, for practical
network topologies (see Section 4), and (ii) mathemat-
ically characterize the difference (via ratio bounds) in
profit for SVs with and without price differentiation
(see Section 3.2, Theorem 3 and its proof), for general
topologies.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we propose our seller-buyer system
model. We first, we qualitatively describe the general en-
vironment comprising SVs (the sellers), their clients (the
buyers), and the agencies (e.g., cyberinsurance firms)
that might benefit from SV pricing mechanisms. We then
describe the SV pricing rationale. Finally, we analytically
define the seller-buyer interaction framework. A sum-
mary of main notation is shown in Table 1.
2.1 General Setting
We consider a system where potentially multiple security
vendors exists in a market. We assume that all network
users have access to some paid security software, e.g.,
antivirus software, developed by a given security vendor
1. We assume that SV clients form a logical network
(e.g., via Gmail, Facebook, Twitter, etc.). These networks
are the most common substrate for facilitating social
1. It is a well known fact that many Internet users use free pirated
versions of anti-virus software, or sample free versions. For simplicity,
we do not consider this issue in the paper. However, we believe
that this issue can be resolved by regulatory agencies via appropriate
policies and mandates so that every user is officially associated with
a particular security vendor.
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engineering attacks that are currently amongst the most
common cyberattack methods in practice [14]. However,
our work is also applicable to non-logical network struc-
tures.
With respect to a cyber-insurance setting (the example
setting for our paper motivating price differentiation
by SVs), the SVs can form a symbiotic relationship
with ISPs, which can act as a cyber-insurance agency.
In view of recent recommendations made by an FCC
advisory committee2, ISPs have committed to taking
steps to combat cyber-security threats (e.g., enforcing
antibot conduct code, executing the ability to monitor,
trace, analyse, and block traffic without violating privacy
rules, and educating Internet users to access the web
safely. Thus, we envision a future where SVs can work
in collaboration with ISPs to make cyber-space secure.
The ISPs can act as cyber-insurers, where a client locks-
in with particular SV through an ISP providing service to
the client. This could happen if while signing an Internet
agreement with the ISP, the client is required to buy
security products by a particular vendor in a symbiotic
business relationship with an ISP.
2.2 SV Pricing Rationale
We consider SVs adopting a heterogenous product pric-
ing mechanism that is based on the logical communica-
tion network of its consumers and their corresponding
security investments. The motivation for heterogenous
pricing manner is for an SV to make more profit from
its security products compared to that obtained from
uniform pricing, through extra client information ob-
tained from ISPs. In addition, it would also seem fair to
price network users heterogenously due to the differing
amounts of positive externalities they generate through
their security investments. With a uniform pricing mech-
anism, some users pay more compared to the externality
they generate, and vice versa, thereby leading to the
existence of free-riders in the network. One way for
SVs to envision a free-rider free network is to deploy a
heterogenous pricing scheme for their clients. A thing to
note here is that price heterogeneity or discrimination
in general might not go down well with consumers,
primarily raising network neutrality concerns. However,
SVs can get topology and security investment related
information about their clients from ISPs (and hence
proportionately estimate client generated externalities)
through disclosure agreements signed between the ISP,
the SV, and their clients, as part of a mandate imposed by
the government [15]. In doing so, the SVs can convince
consumers of a heterogenous but fair pricing mechanism
in operation that will raise fewer eyebrows.
2.3 Seller-Buyer Interaction
To mathematically illustrate the buyer-seller interaction,
for simplicity of analysis, in this section we only consider
a monopoly setting with a single SV serving clients
forming a logical network. In this regard, we assume
that a monopolistic SV (seller) has N clients (consumers),
connected via a logical network and using self-defense
products manufactured by the SV. Each consumer i N
2. FCC chairman Julius Genachowski spoke at the Cybersecurity
Bipartisan Policy Center on the role of ISPs in improving cybersecurity
(2012).
has a utility function, ui(·), given as
ui(xi,
−→x−i, pi) = αixi − βix2i + xi ·
∑
j
hijxj − pixi, (1)
where xi, a continuous variable, is the amount of self-
defense/self-protection features consumed or invested in
by user i, −→x−i is the vector of self-defense investments
of users other than i, and pi is the price charged by
the SV to user i per unit of self-defense investment
consumed by i. In reality, SV products are bundled in
a package which is priced as a single item. However,
every bundled package has a number of features which
different users use differently, and the effectiveness of
a user’s security protection would depend on how he
uses those features [14]. In that light, we assume that xi
is continuous. Here pi is the equilibrium market price
set by the SV (in case of a competitive setting, the
equilibrium price is set after competing with other SVs in
the security product business.). αi, βi, hij are constants.
αi, βi are constants associated with a user’s individual
investments xi, and hij is the amount of externality user
j exerts on user i through his per unit investments.
Here hij ≥ 0 and hii = 0,∀i. xi is assumed to be
continuous for analysis tractability reasons. The first and
second term in the utility function denote the utility to a
user solely dependent on his own investments, the third
term is the positive externality effects of investments
made by other users in the network on user i, and
the fourth term is the price user i pays for consuming
xi units of self-defense goods manufactured by the SV.
We assume here that xi is bounded. It is well known
that the quadratic nature of the utility function allows for a
tractable analysis and offers a nice second-order approximation
to higher order concave payoffs, while preserving the properties
of utility functions for risk-averse users. The insight into
why quadratic functions serve as a good approximation to
higher order concave functions is related to the point in the
function curve when the law of diminishing returns starts to
hold. For different cost functions the point is different, but
inherently it exists on every curve. So the trends one observes
by analyzing (or simulating) general concave costs is the same
as those observed by analyzing (simulating) quadratic concave
functions.
The SV accounts for the strategic investment behavior
(after it would have set its prices) of users it provides
service to, and decides on an optimal pricing scheme that
arises from the solution to the following unconstrained
optimization problem.
max−→p
∑
i
pixi − cxi,
where −→p are the vectors of prices charged by the SV to
its consumers, and xi is the amount of self-defense goods
consumed by consumer i after the SV sets its prices. c
is the constant marginal cost to the SV to manufacture a
unit of any of its products. For the analysis that follows
in the paper, we will assume for all i, (i) 2βi >
∑
j N hij
and (ii) αi > c. Assumption (i) implies that the concavity
of user utility functions and that the optimal investment
level of network users are bounded, and assumption
(ii) implies that all network users purchase a positive
amount of security product manufactured by the SV.
3 THE SV PRICING MECHANISM
Our goal in this section is to (i) study and analyze opti-
mal pricing mechanisms for SVs and the corresponding
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security investments of their clients (consumers), and (ii)
to draw potential relationships between the structure
of the client network with SV prices and consumer
investments. We first describe a single-period two-stage
Stackelberg pricing game between an SV and its con-
sumers. We then state the mathematical results related
to the pricing game equilibria for the monopoly setting
under both, the heterogenous and the uniform pricing
scenarios, and provide the relevant practical implications
of the results. Finally, we address the problem of design-
ing an optimal pricing mechanism for the binary pricing
scenario, which is a special case of the heterogenous
pricing scenario, but is NP-hard. For simplicity, we do
not analyse the oligopoly setting of SVs for closed form
expressions of game parameters at equilibria. However,
we conduct simulation experiments on the oligoply set-
ting (see Section 4).
3.1 Defining the Pricing Game
Our proposed SV pricing mechanism entails a one-
period, two-stage Stackelberg pricing game consisting of
the following two steps.
1) The SV chooses a price vector −→p so as to maximize
its profits via the following optimization problem.
max−→p
∑
i
pixi − cxi,
We consider three types of consumer pricing sce-
narios in the paper:
• Scenario 1 - the SV does not price discriminate
amongst its consumers and all elements of −→p
are identical, i.e., pi = p, ∀i.
• Scenario 2 (binary pricing) - the SV charges two
types of prices per unit of user investment: a
regular price denoted as preg for each user in
a particular category, and a discounted price,
denoted as pdsc for other users,
• Scenario 3 - the SV charges different prices to
different consumers.
2) Consumer i chooses to consume xi units of self-
defense products, so as to maximize his utility
ui(xi, ,
−→x−i, pi) given the prices chosen by the SV.
Since the pricing strategy is the output of a dynamic
consisting of two stages, we will analyze the subgame
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game, instead of
just focussing on traditional Nash equilibria. A strategy
profile is a SPNE if it represents a Nash equilibrium
of every subgame of the original game. Informally, this
means that if (1) the players played any smaller game
that consisted of only one part of the larger game and
(2) their behavior represents a Nash equilibrium of that
smaller game, then their behavior is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the larger game. Every finite extensive
game, like ours, has a subgame perfect equilibrium [16].
3.2 Results - Pricing Strategy
In this section, we state results related to the pricing
strategy arising from the game equilibria and analyze the
intuition and practical implications behind those results.
We first comment on the equilibria of the second stage
of the two-stage pricing game, given a vector of prices−→p . Given −→p , the second stage of our pricing game is
a subgame and we denote it as Gsub. We then have the
following theorem. The proof of the theorem is in Section
6.
Theorem 1. Gsub has a unique Nash equilibrium and is
represented in closed form as
xi = BR(
−→x−i) = αi − pi
2βi
+
1
2βi
∑
jN
hijxj , (2)
where BR(−→x−i) is the strategic best response of user i when
other users in the network consume −→x−i. In the case when
SV does not price discriminate its consumers, the Nash
equilibrium vector of user investments is given by
−→x = (Q−G)−1(−→α −−→p −→1 ), (3)
where −→p is the optimal uniform per unit investment price
charged by the SV to all its consumers, and Q is a matrix that
takes values 2βi at location (i, j) if i = j and zero otherwise.
Theorem Intuition and Implications: The intuition behind
a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is the fact
that increasing one’s consumption (security investment)
incurs a positive externality on his peers, which further
implies that the game involves strategic complementarities3
[16], and therefore the equilibria are ordered. This mono-
tonic ordering results in a unique NE [17]. The benefit
of dealing with a single equilibrium vector for Gsub is
the ease with which the SV can decide on its optimal
strategy.
Optimal Pricing Strategy We now discuss the optimal
pricing strategy for the SV given that the users self-
protect according to the Nash equilibrium of Gsub. Before
going into the details we first define the concept of a
Bonacich centrality in a network of heterogenous users.
The Bonacich centrality measure [18] is a sociological
graph-theoretic measure of network influence. It assigns
relative influence scores to all nodes in the network
based on the concept that connections to high-scoring
nodes contribute more to the score of the node in ques-
tion than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. In
our work, the Bonacich measure of a user reflects his
influence on other users of the network via the positive
externalities generated by him through his self-defense
investments4. Formally, let G be a matrix defining the
logical network of N users (consumers), and having in
its entries the hij values. Let D be a diagonal matrix, and−→w be a weight vector. The weighted Bonacich centrality
vector is given by
B(G,D,−→w ) = (I −GD)−1−→w , (4)
where (I −GD)−1 is well-defined and non-negative.
We now have our first result regarding the optimal
prices charged by the SV to its consumers. The proof of
the theorem is in Section 6.
Theorem 2. The unique optimal price vector −→p charged by
the SV is given by
−→p =
−→α + c · −→1
2
+GQ−1B(G′, Q−1,
−→
w′)−GTQ−1B(G′, Q−1,−→w′),
(5)
where G′ = G+G
T
2 and
−→
w′ =
−→α−c·−→1
2 .
3. In economics and game theory, the decisions of two or more
players are called strategic complements if they mutually reinforce one
another.
4. The use of the concept of Bonacich centrality in externality driven
networks is explained in [7]
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In the case when the SV does not price discriminate its con-
sumers, the unique optimal price (same for every consumer)
charged per consumer is given by
p =
1
2
−→
1 T (Q−G)−1(−→α + c−→1 )
−→
1 T (Q−G)−1−→1
. (6)
Theorem Intuition and Implications: The optimal price
vector in the no price discrimination case is independent
of individual node centralities, whereas in the price
discrimination case the optimal price vector depends on
the Bonacich centrality of individual users. The intuition
behind the result is the fact that users tend to invest
in security mechanisms proportional to their Bonacich
centrality (and in turn generate proportional amount of
network externalities) in the Nash Equilibrium [19][20].
Therefore it makes sense for the SV to charge users based
on their Bonacich centralities when price discrimination
is possible. In addition, Equation (5) has three parts to
its price vector expression. The first subexpression is that
part of the price vector that is topology invariant. The
second subexpression is that part of the price vector
that is topology variant and reflects the markup price
charged to network users for the positive externalities
they gain due to the security investments of other users.
Finally, the third subexpression is that part of the price
vector which is topology variant and reflects user price
discounts for the benefits they provide to other users in
the network through their security investments.
We now state the following result regarding profit
amounts made by an SV in pricing scenarios 1 and 3.
The proof of the theorem is in Section 6.
Theorem 3. The profits, P0 and P1, made by an SV when the
latter does not (does) account for user investment externalities
are given by does not:
P0 =

(−→α − c · −→1
2
)T
(Q−G)−1
(−→α − c · −→1
2
) (7)
and does:
P1 =

(−→α − c · −→1
2
)T
(Q−G′)−1
(−→α − c · −→1
2
) . (8)
Assuming Q − G to be positive definite, the bounds of the
ratio of profits in these two cases is given by
0 ≤ 1
2
+ λmin(K) ≤ P0
P1
≤ 1
2
+ λmax(K) ≤ 1, (9)
where R = Q−G and λmin(·), λmax(·) denote the minimum
and maximum eigenvalues of their arguments respectively,
and K =
(
RR−T+RTR−1
4
)
.
In brief, the main intuition behind the theorem result
is that an SV can make more profits when accounting
for network externalities compared to when it does not.
The inuition here is that more informed pricing implies
more profit. We postpone a more detailed explanation of
the theorem intuitions and its implications to Section 4,
as we find it appropriate to first plot the ratio of P0P1 for
instances of different graph topologies to gain a better
understanding of the theorem implications.
3.3 The Case of Binary Pricing
In reality, the idea of charging multiple different prices
to various consumers may not be very practical to
implement, primarily because of the difficulty to select
different classes of users paying different prices. To make
things simpler, an SV can opt to charge two types of
prices for two different classes of consumers: (i) a dis-
counted price, pdsc, for consumers who have significant
positive influence on the security of a network based on
their network location and the amount of investments
made, (ii) and a regular price, preg for the other con-
sumers. Thus, the first goal of an SV is to determine
the subset of consumers who should be offered the
discounted price so as to maximize the SVs own profits.
Given that preg and pdsc are exogenously specified, the
profit optimization problem for an SV is given by
Maximize (−→p − c−→1 )T (Q−G)−1(−→α −−→p )
s.t. pi  {preg, pdsc}, ∀i N.
Note here that the expression, (Q − G)−1(−→α − −→p ), in
the objective function is the NE investment amount
of users in self-defense mechanisms. Thus, we have a
combinatorial optimization problem for maximizing the
profits of an SV. In order to investigate the tractability
of the problem, we first formulate it in the following
manner:
OPT : Maximize (δ−→y + c′−→1 )T (Q−G)−1(−→α′ − δ−→y )
s.t. yi  {−1, 1}, ∀i N.
Here δ = preg − pT , where pT = preg+pdsc2 ,
−→
a′ = −→a − pT ,
and c′ = pT − c ≥ δ. Note that using these variables,
the feasible price allocation can be expressed as −→p =
δ−→y + pT . Our next result comments on the intractability
of solving OPT. The proof of the result which is in Section
6, is based on the reduction of OPT from the well-known
MAX-CUT problem [21].
Theorem 4. Given that preg and pdsc are exogenously
specified by the SV, in the binary pricing case an SV’s profit
optimization problem, OPT, is NP-hard.
Theorem Intuitions and Implications: The i, jth entry of
(Q − G)−1 gives a measure of how much the edge
between i and j contributes to the centrality of consumer
i. Therefore, the MAX-CUT interpretation roughly sug-
gests that the optimal solution of the pricing problem is
achieved when the monopolist tries to price discriminate
consumers that influence each other significantly, how-
ever, at the same time takes into account the consumers’
value of consumption in the absence of network effects.
The NP-hard nature of the pricing problem implies the
impracticality of computing optimal prices in practice
and thus drives the need to design schemes to com-
puting optimal binary prices up to a certain acceptable
approximation. The following theorem states the result
of approximating optimal prices charged in the binary
pricing case. The theorem exploits the relation of OPT to
the MAX-CUT problem, and establishes that there exists
an algorithm that provides a solution with a provable
approximation guarantee. The proof of the theorem is in
Section 6.
Theorem 5. Let WOPT be the optimal value for problem
OPT. Then, there exists a randomized polynomial-time algo-
rithm that outputs a solution with objective value Walg such
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that E[Walg] + r > 0.878(WOPT + r), where
r = δ2
−→
1 TA
−→
1 +δ
−→
1 T |A−→a′−AT c′−→1 |−c′−→1 TA−→a′−2δ2Trace(A),
and
A = (Q−G)−1
Theorem Implications: Clearly, if r ≤ 0, which, is the
case when δ is small, this algorithm provides at least
an 0.878-optimal solution of the problem. On the other
hand, if r > 0, we obtain 0.878 optimality after a constant
(r) addition to the objective function. This suggests that
for small r > 0, the algorithm still provides near-optimal
solutions.
4 NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we perform an extensive numerical eval-
uation study of monopoly and oligopoly SV pricing
markets comprising of (i) autonomous SVs and (ii)
rational, non-colluding consumers connected through
a logical communication network. Through numerical
simulations, we aim to address the following questions:
1) What is the relationship between SV prices and the
client network topology?
2) For any given pricing scenario, how does the net-
work location of a consumer relate with their total
security investment amount?
3) Are the SV pricing schemes fair to network users?
4) How does the peformance of SV pricing schemes
differ between the monopolistic and oligopolistic
market settings?
4.1 Parameters and Markets
Parameter Setting: We deal with preferential attach-
ment (PA) and random tree network topologies in this
work (see Section 4.2 for details). For both monopolistic
and oligopolistic market settings, the model parameters
(e.g., PA and random tree networks) are as follows:
c = 0.5, αi = 2, βi ∈ {2, 2.5, 3} (for the preferential
attachment mechanism), and βi =
|G|
20 (for random trees),
for all i N . The parameters αi and βi are chosen to
make sure that the utility function of each client is twice
differentiable and strictly increasing. We assume that
the influence matrix G is such that for all i, hij = 1di ,
where di is the number of non-negative entries in row
i of G. Due to several competing SVs serving clients
on the same network G in an oligopolistic setting, we
assume that information on the estimates of externalities
generated by consumer investments can be exchanged
for free amongst the competing SVs in a truthful manner.
Market Setting: For the purposes of simulation, we
assume a monopolistic market setting with one SV, and
an oligoplistic setting with two SVs. To simulate the
oligopolistic competition between the SVs, each SV first
plays a Stackelberg price game amongst its clients as in
the monopoly setting to reach a Stackelberg equilibrium
price vector that is either single priced or binary priced,
and then repeatedly plays with its competing SV in
multiple rounds to converge upon a sub-game perfect
market Nash equilibrium price vector. This dynamic
repeated pricing game between competing SVs is played
with the mindset of an SV being able to prevent its clients
from switching to a different SV after each round. Finally,
on convergence, each SV and its clients play the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. In our work
we practically obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium (for the
monopoly setting) and the market Nash equilibrium (for
the oligopoly setting) price vectors in an iterative fashion
using the standard fictitous play technique in game theory
[22].
4.2 Topology Formation
We choose preferential attachment graphs as one topol-
ogy type as they represent real world social/logical
network interactions [23]. A random graph formed by
the PA process can have two extremes: (i) a new born
user can influence users born earlier, i.e., G1ij > 0 for
all i, j and j born after i, and (ii) only older users
influence new users, i.e., G1ij > 0 for all i, j and j
born before i. We can thus form a family of PA graphs
parameterized by µ  [0, 1], which we call the ‘influence
value’, such that Gµ is a linear combination of G1 and
G2, i.e., Gµ = µG1+(1−µ)G2. Here µ is a parameter that
controls the influencing nature of a user in a PA graph
w.r.t. the positive externality effects of their security
investments made on users born before and later. A µ
value of 1 generates random graph G1, whereas a µ
value of 0 generates random graph G2. For networks
of size 500, we generate 50 random PA graphs for each
different value of µ ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of
0.1. As an example, each point in a sub-plot in Figure
1 is the average of the 50 random P0P1 values obtained
per value of µ (the x-axis). Each sub-plot is the average
of 50 graphs for a particular value of β, the scale-free
exponent parameter for PA graphs, β (in many papers
also denoted as γ) is known to generally lie between
[2, 3], and for our experiments we choose three discrete
values of β: 2, 2.5, and 3.
We choose tree topologies as they often represent
corporate and enterprise social networks. Since a single
SV is likely to serve these sort of networks, we do not consider
and oligopolistic setting for these networks. In this work, we
consider random trees of specific types. Given a constant
λ > 0, a depth-d Poisson tree T (λ, d) with parameter
λ where depth d is constructed as follows: the root
node has degree which is a random variable distributed
according to a Poisson distribution with parameter λ.
All the children of the root have outdegrees which are
also random, with the same distribution. We continue
this process until either the process stops at some depth
d′ < d, where no node in level d′ has any children or until
we reach level d. In this case, all the children of nodes
in level d are deleted and the nodes in level d becomes
leaves. In this paper, we fix d = 999999, to represent =.∞.
Note that star topologies are formed as a special case of
tree topologies. We generate P0P1 plots for tree graphs of
size 500 in Figure 2, in the same manner as we generate
PA graphs above, i.e., based on influence values. Each
point in the sub-plots is the average of 50 instances for
a fixed value of λ. For our work we let λ ∈ {1, 3, 5}.
For the purposes of simulation we assume for all i that
βi =
|G|
20 and αi − c = 1. We also assume that for each i
the hij values are equal to 1di , where di is the number of
non-negative entries in row i of G.
4.3 Plot Observations and Insights
Profit Improvement: Our plot results for(i) the preferen-
tial attachment graphs for both the monopoly and oligopoly
setting (see Figures 1,3) and (ii) tree topology graphs for
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Fig. 1: 500 Node Profit Ratio (Monopoly) for (a) β = 3 (left), (b) β = 2.5 (middle), and (c) β = 2 (right) [PA Graphs]
Fig. 2: 500 Node Profit Ratio (Monopoly) for (a) β = 1 (left), (b) β = 3 (middle), and (c) β = 5 (right) [Tree Topology]
Fig. 3: Profit Ratio (Oligopoly with 3 iterations) for (a) β = 1 (left), (b) β = 3 (middle), and (c) β = 5 (right) [PA Graphs]
Fig. 4: 500 Node Profit Ratio (Oligopoly) for (a) β = 1 (left), (b) β = 3 (middle), and (c) β = 5 (right) [PA Graphs]
the monopoly setting only (see Figure 2) show that (a)
the provable profit ratio bounds are not reasonably tight
enough, and are less than 15, implying the fact that an SV
can do better in terms of profit when it has full informa-
tion compared to the case when it is not informed about
consumer externality values and their network location
properties, and (b) the gap between the ratio obtained
from simulations and its lower bound decreases with
increase in µ (influence) values. The reason for the trend
in (b) can be explained as follows: note that the gap
between the ratio obtained by simulations and its lower
bound denotes the profit loss of the security vendor from
ignoring the network externalities during the pricing
process. This gap will be larger for lower values of µ
as it implies that nodes with higher centrality values
are affecting nodes with low centrality values and the
insurer is not taking this externality into account while
charging its clients, thereby reducing profits. When µ
values are high, the insurer does not take into account
the externality effects of low centrality users on high
centrality users, which does not affect the profits as
much.
Implications from Theorem 3: As observed from the
plots in Figure 1 related to preferential attachment
graphs, the profits to the SV are greater when it accounts
for externalities than when it does not, and an SV could
5. Here ‘1’ is the trivial upper bound. However, for the simulations
in this work, the non-trivial upper bound obtained is very close to 1.
make up to approximately 25% extra profits (based on
our model) with complete information for monopoly
markets, and up to approximately 18% in oligopoly
markets (see Figure 3). This is intuitive in the sense that
the SV has more user information when knowing about
the externalities and can price optimally to increase
its profits. However, in reality it is difficult to mea-
sure/observe the externalities. Thus, in spite of getting
topological information from the insurer, an SV might
have to price its products without taking externalities
into account. The profits for the non-price discrimination
scenario are encapsulated as a special case of P1 when
G has all entries equal except the zero diagonal entries.
We also observe from Figure 1 that (i) the plot trends
are invariant of the graph topology, i.e., with different
β values, the sub-plots look nearly the same, and (ii)
increasing the network size does not affect the plot
trends either.
Our plot results for random tree graphs in the monopoly
setting are very similar to those of preferential attach-
ment graphs (see Figure 2), for reasons noted above
except that for influence values between 0.7 and 1.0, the
profit ratio curve increases towards values in the range
[.95 .99] and then decreases. This trend is due to the
fact that at an influence value of around 0.8, the graph
topology and investment externalities have little effect
on the optimal prices charged by the SV, and as a result
the difference between P0 and P1 is minimal. Intuitively,
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Fig. 5: 50-Node Plots for (a) Per-Unit SV Prices (left) and (b) Total User Investment (right) when β = 3(PA Graph Topology)
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Fig. 6: 50-Node Plots for (a) Per-Unit SV Prices (left) and (b) Total User Investment (right) when λ = 3 (Tree Topology)
Fig. 7: 50-Node Plots for Total User Investment when β = 3 (PA Graphs) in an Oligopoly Setting
this happens because when deciding what price to offer
to a user, the monopolist considers the trade-off between
profit loss due to (potentially) subsidizing the user and
increase in profits due to the user’s externality influence
over their peers. The profit loss is proportional to the
security investment of the user, and it increases with the
influence of the network on this user. The profit increase
term, on the other hand relates to the influence of the
agent on the rest of the network. At an influence value of
0.8, the profit loss nearly equals profit gain and network
and externality effects does not affect the profit ratio
by a significant margin. For all other influence values,
the effects of the network and investment externali-
ties are non-signifcant. We emphasize that the rationale
proposed here also applies to the trends observed on
preferential attachment graphs, but there the peak point
is achieved for an influence value of 1.
Oligopoly - Converging and Non-Converging Scenar-
ios: In Figures 3 and 4, we specifically see the difference
in market output for two autonomous SVs. In Figure 3,
we plot the profit ratios for SV1 and SV2 when we run
three iterations of the two stage pricing game involving
the SVs and their clients. We see a gap in the profit ratio
between the two SVs due to the non-convergence of the
SV and client strategies, within three iterations. How-
ever, in Figure 4, when we plot the profit ratios under
game convergence (achieved speedily, in approximately
eight iterations), we observe the similarity in the profit
ratios for both the SVs. The gap in the profit ratio per-
formance between the market convergence and market
non-convergence settings is intuitive and a reflection of
reality where businesses take mutiple rounds to stabilize.
Topology Dependent Pricing and Investments: In the
monopoly setting, if the monopolist is only allowed to
charge a uniform per-unit price to all its clients, the
optimal price is computed to be p0 = 1 per unit of invest-
ment, for one instance of a 50-node (user) PA generated
network with β = 3. For the same network instance
we plot the heterogenous prices charged to users, in
Figure 5a. We observe that the per-unit prices decrease with
the increase in the centrality of nodes. For the two-price
case, we primarily focus on obtaining the sets of users
paying the discounted and regular price respectively,
based on the users’ security investment amounts. For a
given instance of a 50-node network we first assume that
the prices are given exogenously and are pL = 0.85, and
pH = 1.15, i.e., a 15 percent deviation from the optimal
single uniform price. We emphasize here that our value
of 15% is arbitrarily chosen based on our experience
of binary prices of certain products in our day-to-day
lives in Los Angeles. Next, we compute the optimal
user investment for that same 50-node network instance,
when (i) the monopolist can only use the binary pricing
scheme, and (ii) when it can perfectly price discriminate.
The corresponding total consumption levels for all users
for the three different pricing scenarios are given in
Figure 5b. We repeat the same process for an arbitrary
instance of a 50-node graph formed using the random
tree generation process noted above. Here, the optimal
uniform price per client is computed to be p0 = 1.2
per unit of investment, and we again adopt the 15%
deviation rule for binary prices. We report the results
in Figure 6a and 6b. For the oligopoly setting in PA
networks, we plot total consumption level for all clients
of both the SVs in Figures 7a and 7b on iteratively
achieving a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
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The plot results suggest that for each of the three pric-
ing scenarios in both monopoly and oligopoly markets,
the resulting consumption (amount in security invest-
ments) profiles are similar. We observe that the users
who are the most influential, i.e., influence the rest of
the users more than they are influenced, consume the
largest amounts of the good. This observation supports
the theoretical result in [19][20]. Moreover, as predicted
by our analysis, it is precisely these consumers that are
offered the most favorable per-unit consumption prices
(in the heterogenous pricing case) by the monopolist (as
seen from Figures 5a and 6a.). The combination of these two
observations also leads us to the fact that the total cost incurred
by a network user is nearly a constant in the heterogenous
pricing setting, thus leading to consumer fairness. Finally,
even when the monopolist is constrained to charging
two prices, it tries to favor those central consumers, who
end up getting the discounted price (see Figures 5a and
6a.).
Relaxing Model Assumptions: We made a few impor-
tant assumptions to simplify the model analysis that we
relax while conducting a simulation study to verify the
strength and necessity of the assumptions. For simula-
tion purposes we have not assumed Q−G to necessarily
be positive definite, and still we observe trends of profit
ratio, P0P1 , to follow results in Theorem 3. This implies that
the assumption that Q − G should be positive definite
for Equation (9) to hold, is not an important one, even
though from an analysis perspective, positive definite-
ness of the matrix Q−G ensures closed form expressions
of P0P1 bounds. We also do not enforce 2βi >
∑
j N hij
for simulation purposes and observe that optimal user
investments are bounded for many random samples of
PA and tree topologies.
Takeaway Message in Relation to Network Effects:
We have shown through both theory and simulations
that heterogenously pricing network users based on their
location and security investment amounts in a consumer
overlay network is fair for each consumer (since the
product of the consumption amount and the per unit
price is nearly a constant for every user), and at the same
time allows the SV to make more profits than it would
make in case of uniform pricing (as in the current market
scenario). This is true for both the monopoly as well as
the oligopoly setting. The extra profit in turn allows SVs
to transfer some profit to cyber-insurance agencies in a
symbiotic relationship with them.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied a market for differentiated
security product pricing, primarily with a view to ensur-
ing that security vendors (SVs) make more profit in the
differentiated pricing case compared to the case of non-
differentiated pricing. We have mathematically modeled
the profit made by security vendors, and proposed a
novel consumer differentiated pricing mechanism for
SVs based on (i) their consumers’ logical network lo-
cations and (ii) security investment amounts made by
the consumers. We validated our analytical model via
extensive simulations conducted on practical SV client
topologies, and showed that a monopoly SV could im-
prove their current profit margins by upto ≈ 25% (based
on the simulation settings) by accounting for client lo-
cation in the consumer network and their investment
information, whereas in an oligopoly setting, SVs could
increase their current profit margins by approximately
upto ≈ 18%. Specifically, the intuition behind our results
(as shown via both theory and simulations) is that price
discriminating consumers in proportion to the Bonacich
centrality of individual users results in maximum profit
for an SV. In addition, we showed that our proposed SV
pricing mechanism also ensures consumer fairness (a no-
tion similar to network neutrality) at market equilibrium
by (i) charging each consumer a per unit product usage
price based on (a) their location in the logical network
and (b) the amount of positive externality they generates
through his security investments, and (ii) equally costing
each client nearly a constant total amount in security
investments, irrespective of the client’s overlay network
location. Finally, we also tackled the combinatorial NP-
hard problem of SVs optimally price discriminating con-
sumers when there are only two price categories, i.e.,
regular and discounted. In this regard, we designed a
randomized-approximation algorithm to the binary pric-
ing problem that provides an approximation guarantee
of 0.878 within the optimal solution of the total profit
made by an SV.
6 PROOFS OF THEOREMS
In this section we provide the proofs of Theorems 1-5.
We first state and prove the relevant lemmas required
for the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. The game Gsub is supermodular6.
Proof. The payoff/utility functions are continuous, the
strategy sets are real compact subsets, and for any two
consumers i, j N , ∂
2ui
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0. Hence Gsub is supermod-
ular. 
Lemma 2. The spectral radius of Q−1G is smaller than
1, and the matrix I −Q−1G is invertible.
Proof. Let −→v be an eigenvector of Q−1G with λ being
the corresponding eigenvalue, with |vi| > |vj | for all
j N . We have the following equation due to the fact
that (Q−1G)−→v = λ−→v .
|λvi| = |(Q−1Gi)−→v | ≤
∑
j N
(Q−1G)ij |vj | ≤ 1
2βi
|vi|
∑
j N
hij <
vi
2
.
(10)
Here (Q−1G)i denotes the i−th row of (Q−1G). Since the
equation holds for any eigenvalue-eigenvector pair, the
spectral radius of (Q−1G) is strictly smaller than 1. Now
observe that each eigenvalue of I−Q−1G can be written
as 1 − λ. Since the spectral radius of Q−1G is strictly
smaller than 1, none of the eigenvalues of I − Q1G is
zero, and thus the matrix is invertible. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Since Gsub is a supermodular game,
the equilibrium set has a minimum and a maximum
element [17]. Let −→x denote the maximum of the equi-
librium set and let S be such that xi > 0 only if i  S.
If S = φ there cannot be another equilibrium point,
since −→x = 0 is the maximum of the equilibrium set.
Assume for a contradictory purpose that S 6= φ and
there is another equilibrium
−→˜
x , of the game. By the
supermodularity property of Gsub, xi ≥ x˜i,∀i N . Allow
k to equal argmaxi Nxi − x˜i. Since −→x and −→˜x are not
equal, we have xk − x˜k > 0. Since at NE no consumer
has an incentive to increase or decrease his consumption,
6. In supermodular games, the marginal utility of increasing a
player’s strategy increases with the increases in other players’ strate-
gies.
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we have
xk − x˜k ≤ 1
2βk
Gk(
−→x −−→˜x ) = 1
2βk
∑
j
hkj(xj − x˜j), (11)
where Gk is the k − th row of G. But we have
1
2βk
∑
j
hkj(xj − x˜j) ≤ xk − x˜k
2βk
∑
j
hkj < xk − x˜k (12)
Thus, we reach a contradiction and Gsub has a unique
Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We have from Lemma 1 that
Q − G is non-singular and as a result the following
equation holds.
−→p = −→α−(Q−G)
(
Q−G− G
T −G
2
)−1 −→α − c · −→1
2
(13)
Equation (4) can we rewritten as
−→p = −→α −
(
I − G
T −G
2
(Q−G)−1
)−1 −→α − c · −→1
2
(14)
By the matrix inversion lemma [24], we have(
I − G
T −G
2
(Q−G)−1
)−1
= I +
GT −G
2
(
Q− G
T +G
2
)−1
(15)
Thus, from Equation (5) it follows that
−→p = α+ c
−→
1
2
− G
T −G
2
(
Q− G
T +G
2
)−1 −→α − c−→1
2
(16)
Applying Equation(7) and using the definition of
weighted Bonacich centrality, we get
−→p =
−→α + c · −→1
2
+GQ−1B(G′, Q−1,
−→
w′)−GTQ−1B(G′, Q−1,−→w′)
and thus prove Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The optimal price vector of the
SV without and with the consideration of externality
effects are given by the following equations.
−→p0 =
−→α + c · −→1
2
. (17)
and
−→p1 = −→α − (Q−G)
(
Q− G+G
T
2
)−1
α− c · −→1
2
. (18)
The corresponding consumption vectors are given by
−→x0 = (Q−G)−1
−→α − c · −→1
2
. (19)
and
−→x1 = (Q−G′)−1
−→α − c · −→1
2
. (20)
It then follows that
P0 = (
−→p0 − c · −→1 )T−→x0 =
−→α − c · −→1
2
(Q−G)−1
−→α − c · −→1
2
.
(21)
and
P1 = (
−→p1 − c · −→1 )T−→x1, (22)
P1 can be re-written as
P1 = X − Y,
where
X = 2
(−→α − c · −→1
2
)T (
R+RT
2
)−1(−→α − c · −→1
2
)
,
and
Y =
(−→α − c · −→1
2
)T (
R+RT
2
)−1(−→α − c · −→1
2
)
.
Thus, we have
P1 =

(−→α − c · −→1
2
)T
(Q−G′)−1
(−→α − c · −→1
2
) ,
Now let −→v = α−c·−→12 . We have
P1
P0
=
−→v T (Q−G′)−1−→v
−→v T (Q−G)−1−→v ≤ max||−→x=1||
−→x T
(
R+R′
2
)−1−→x
−→x T R−1+R−T2 −→x
.
(23)
Since R
−T+R−1
2 and
RT+R
2 are symmetric positive defi-
nite matrices, we have from the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem
[25] the following.
K = λmax
((
R−1 + R−T
2
)−0.5(
R + RT
2
)−1(
R−1 + R−T
2
)−0.5)
,
(24)
where K = max||−→x=1||
−→x T
(
R+R′
2
)−1−→x
−→x T R−1+R−T2 −→x
. Note that for any
real matrix A and invertible matrix B, the eigenvalues
of A and B−1AB are identical. Thus, it follows that
K = λmax
(
2I +RRT +RTR−1
4
)−1
. (25)
Now since the eigenvalues of RR−T + RTR−1
are real and belong to [−2, 2], the eigenvalues of(
2I+RRT+RTR−1
4
)
are positive, and we have
λmax
(
2I +RRT +RTR−1
4
)−1
=
1
λmin
(
2I +RRT +RTR−1
4
)
.
(26)
Similarly we obtain
max||−→x=1||
−→x T R−1+R−T2 −→x
−→x T (R+R′2 )−1−→x = λmax
(
2I +RRT +RTR−1
4
)
.
(27)
From the above two equations it follows that
1
2
+ λmin
(
2I +RRT +RTR−1
4
)−1
≤ P0
P1
, (28)
and
P0
P1
≤ 1
2
+ λmax
(
2I +RRT +RTR−1
4
)−1
. (29)
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We have thus proved our theorem. .
In order to prove Theorem 4, we first state the
well known MAX-CUT problem [21] is as follows:
max
∑
(i,j) E
Wij(1− xixj)
s.t. xi  {−1,+1}, ∀i  V,
where W denotes a matrix of binary weights consisting
of 0s and 1s. The solution to this problem corresponds
to a cut as follows: let S be the agents who were
assigned value 1 in the optimal solution. Then it is
straightforward to see that the value of the objective
function corresponds to the size of the cut defined by
S and V − S. The problem can also be re-wriiten as
P0 : min−→x TW−→x
s.t. xi  {−1,+1}, ∀i  V.
Now consider the following related problem:
P1 : min−→x TW−→x
s.t. xi  {−1,+1}, ∀i  V,
where W is a symmetric matrix with rational entries that
satisfy 0 < WT =W < 1. In the proof of Theorem 4, we
will first show that P1 is NP-Hard by reducing from
MAX-CUT. We will then reduce P1 to OPT to claim the
correctness of our theorem.
Lemma 3. P1 is NP-Hard.
Proof. We prove our claim by reducing P1 from P0. Let
W be the weight matrix in an instance of P0. Let W =
1
2 ( +W ), where  is a rational number between 0 and
1
2n2 and |V | = n. Observe that for any feasible −→x in P0
or P1, it follows that
2−→x TW(−→x )− n2 ≤ −→x TW−→x ≤ 2−→x TW(−→x ) + n2.
Because the objective of P0 is always an integer and
n2 < 12 , the cost of P0 for any feasible vector
−→x can be
obtained from the cost of P1 by scaling and rounding.
Therefore, since P0 is NP-Hard, it follows that P1 is also
NP-Hard. .
Proof of Theorem 4. Having proved P1 to be NP-Hard,
we now prove Theorem 4 by reducing OPT from P1. We
consider special instances of OPT where G = GT , c = 0,
and −→α = [α, ....., α], and α = preg + pdsc. OPT can then
be re-casted as
OPT2 : min−→x T (Q−G)−→x
s.t. xi  {−1,+1}, ∀i N.
Now consider an instance of P1 with W > 0. Note that
because x2i = 1, P1 is equivalent to
min−→x T (W + γI)−→x
s.t. xi  {−1,+1}, ∀i  V,
where we choose γ as an integer such that
γ > 4 ·max{ρ(W ),
∑
i,j
Wi,j
mini,jWij
}
and ρ(·) is the spectral radius of its argument. The
definition of γ implies that the spectral radius of Wγ is
less than 1. Therefore we have
(W+γI)−1 =
1
γ
(
I − 1
γ
(W − W
2
γ
)− W
2
γ3
(W − W
2
γ
).....
)
.
(30)
Since all entries of W and
(
W − (W 2γ )
)
are positive, the
above equality implies that the off-diagonal entries of
(W+γI)−1 are negative. Therefore (W+γI)−1 = (Q−G)
for some diagonal matrix Q and some G ≥ 0. Thus, it
follows that
((Q−G)−→1 )k =
(
1
γ
(
I − W
γ
+
W 2
γ2
....
)−→
1
)
k
. (31)
Since W > 0, we have
((Q−G)−→1 )k ≥ 1
γ
(
1 +
(
−W
−→
1
γ
)− W
2−→1
γ2
....
)
k
−→
1
)
.
From the definition of γ it follows that W
−→
1
γ ≤
(
(
∑
i.jWij)
γ )
−→
1 ≤ 14
−→
1 . The above inequality implies that
((Q−G)−→1 )k ≥ 1
γ
(
1− 1
4
( ∞∑
l=0
(
1
4
)l))
=
1
γ
(
2
3
)
> 0.
(32)
Thus, P1 can be reduced to an instance of OPT2 by
defining Q and G according to (W + γI)−1 = (Q − G).
Therefore it follows that OPT2, and hence OPT, are
NP-Hard. .
In order to prove Theorem 5, we first describe a
semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation for the
following optimization problem:
max
1
4
∑
i,j
wij(1− xixj))
subject to
xi  {−1,+1} ∀i  V
This optimization problem can be reduced to
max
1
4
∑
i,j
wij(1− νiνj)
subject to
νi  Sn ∀i  V
where νi ·νj denotes the regular inner product of vectors
νi, νj Rn, and Sn denotes the n-dimensional unit sphere,
i.e., Sn = {−→x Rn|−→x · −→x = 1}.. We next show that this
optimization problem leads to a semidefinite program.
Consider the collection of vectors {ν1, ....., νn} such
that νi  Sn. Define a symmetric matrix Y Rn×n such
that Yij = νiνj and Yii = 1. It can be seen that Y = FTF .
where F Rn×n is such that F = [ν1, ......., νn]. This
implies that Y ≥ 0. Conversely, consider a positive
semidefinite matrix Y Rn such that Yii = 1. Since Y
is positive semidefinite, there exists F Rn×n (which can
be obtained from Cholesky factorization of the original
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matrix) such that Y = FTF , it follows that νi · νi = 1.
These arguments imply that the feasible set in
max
1
4
∑
i,j
wij(1− νiνj)
subject to
νi  Sn ∀i  V
can be equivalently written as
max
1
4
∑
i,j
wij(1− νiνj)
subject to
Yi,i = 1∀i  V, Y ≥ 0
We now show a way to obtain a provable approximation
guarantee for binary quadratic optimization problems of
the form:
max−→x TQ−→x + 2−→d T−→x + z
subject to
xi  {−1, 1}, i  {1, ...., n},
where Q,
−→
d , and −→z have rational entries. We observe
that −→x TQ−→x = Trace(Q) + −→x T Q˜−→x , where Q˜ = Q −
diag(Q) and xi  {−1,+1}. Thus, the diagonal entries of
the Q matrix as part of the constant term, and we can
assume that diag(Q) = 0 without any loss of generality.
We can also assume that Q is symmetric. Now consider
the following optimization problem:
max[−→x ; y]TQ′[−→x ; y] + z
subject to
xi  {−1,+1}, i  {1, ....., n},
yi  {−1,+1},
where Q′ is given by the following matrix:
Q′ =
(
Q
−→
d−→
d T 0
)
.
Since [−→x ; y]TQ′[−→x ; y] = −→x TQ−→x +2y−→d T−→x , it follows that
the optimal −→x and the optimal objective values of the
previous two optimization problems are equal. Relaxing
the previous optimization problem we get
max
∑
ij
νi · νjQ′ij + z
subject to
νi  Sn+1, i  {1, ....., n, n+ 1},
and obtain an equivalent semidefinite program (SDP) by
defining Yij = νiνj as follows:
max
∑
ij
YijQ
′
ij + z}
subject to
Yii = 1, i  {1, ....., n, n+ 1},
Y ≥ 0.
Using this semidefinite relaxation one can obtain an
approximate solution to the original problem. We adopt
an approach used by the authors in [26] to achieve this
goal. We have the following lemma to characterize the
approximate solution to our semi-definite program.
Lemma 4. Let z ≥∑i,j |Q′ij |. The solution to the following
optimization problem:
max−→x TQ−→x + 2−→d T−→x + z
subject to
xi  {−1, 1}, i  {1, ...., n},
using the randomized algorithm in [26] achieves at least
0.878 times the optimal objective value of the problem.
Proof. Let W denote the objective value of a solution the
algorithm provides. WM denote the optimal solution of
the underlying quadratic optimization mentioned in the
lemma, and WP denote the optimal value of the SDP
relaxation, then the corresponding optimal value can be
given as
WP =
∑
i,j
Q′ijνi · νj + z.
The solutions of the problem provided by the random-
ized algorithm in [26] gives us the expected contribution
of given agents i and j to the objective function as
Q′ij
(
1− 2arccos(νi,νj)pi
)
. Hence, the expected value of a
solution is given as
E[W ] =
∑
ij
(
1− 2arccos(νi, νj)
pi
)
Q′i,j + z.
Now since z ≥ ∑i,j |Q′ij |, it follows that both WM and
E[W ] are non-negative, also since WP corresponds to the
optimal solution of the relaxation, it follows that WP ≥
WM . Using these it follows that
WP =
∑
i,j:Q′ij>0
Q′ij(1+νi ·νj)+
∑
i,j:Q′ij<0
|Q′ij(1−νi ·νj)+z2
and
E[W ] =W1 +W2.
where
W1 =
∑
i:jQ′ij>0
Q′ij
(
2− 2arccos(νi, νj)
pi
)
and
W2 =
∑
i,j:Q′ij<0
|Qij |2arccos(νi, νj)
pi
+ z2.
Here z2 = z −
∑
i,j |Q′ij | > 0. Since arccosxpi ≥ α2 (1 − x)
and 1− arccosxpi ≥ α2 (1 + x) for all x  [−1,+1], it follows
that E[W ] > 0.878WP ≥ 0.878WM , where α = 0.878. 
A corollary of this result is
E[W ] +
∑
ij
|Q′ij | − z > 0.878(WM +
∑
ij
|Q′ij | − z).
Proof of Theorem 5. Applying the corollary from Lemma
4, the solution to the monopolist’s pricing problem leads
to satisfying the claims in Theorem 5. .
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